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Abstract: For decades, the object of international climate governance has been greenhouse 
gases, standardised to tonnes of carbon dioxide-equivalent. The ongoing inadequacy of 
decarbonisation efforts based on this system have prompted calls to expand the scope of 
international climate governance to include restrictions on the supply of fossil fuels. Such 
initiatives could rely on accountability frameworks based on fossil fuel reserves, production, or 
infrastructure, yet to date there has been little consideration of the different implications for 
climate governance of each of these options. We seek to inform such discussions by 
undertaking a sociotechnical analysis of various existing schemes for the monitoring, 
reporting and verification of fossil fuels. We identify serious risks from anchoring climate 
governance in fossil fuel reserves: the extensive role for expert judgement that enters into the 
construction of reserves figures, and the exclusive control of reserves evaluation and 
classification practices by profit-motivated firms in the fossil fuel industry, raise serious risks 
of “gaming”; moreover, the fact that reserves figures are in part a function of climate 
governance outcomes means reserve-based climate governance would face an endogeneity 
problem. More promising directions for supply-side climate governance, we find, lie in 
accountability frameworks based on a combination of fossil fuel production volumes and 
infrastructure, since infrastructure and production-related transactions are more transparent 
to a wider range of actors. Crucially, this transparency would provide much-needed 
opportunities for democratic oversight of the data underpinning climate governance efforts, 
opening up new channels for holding states to account for their climate performance.  
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International climate governance has historically been anchored in a carbon-based 
accountability framework. The objects of governance under this framework are territorial, 
anthropogenic point sources of greenhouse gas emissions and removals by sinks, 
standardised to tonnes of carbon dioxide-equivalent (CO2e) (Dehm 2018). State responsibility is 
conceptualised in terms of limiting or reducing CO2e, and information about states’ 
performance is generated via systems for the measurement/monitoring, reporting and 
verification (MRV) of greenhouse gas emissions and removals. While state responsibility for 
net territorial greenhouse gas emissions remains a broadly accepted climate governance 
norm, experience with actually existing carbon-based MRV systems has led many to 
question whether carbon-based accountability frameworks are conducive to just and 
effective climate mitigation in the public interest.1  
At the same time, many scholars, activists and policymakers have sought to direct attention 
upstream, calling for international climate initiatives structured around measures to restrain 
and reduce the supply of fossil fuels (Asheim et al. 2019; Collier and Venables 2015; Green 
2018b; Green and Denniss 2018; Newell and Simms 2020; Piggot et al. 2018). We argue that if 
this cooperation is to eventuate, a fossil fuel-based accountability framework is needed—one in 
which state responsibility and associated MRV systems become focused on a new object of 
governance, namely fossil fuel reserves, production, or infrastructure. But which of these 
objects is most conducive to just and effective supply-side climate governance? 
To date, there has been little research on the potential of these alternative fossil fuel-based 
accountability frameworks to contribute to climate governance. A handful of studies in the 
last decade broke important ground by considering the merits and drawbacks for climate 
governance of allocating state responsibility for climate change on the basis of fossil fuel 
extraction (Davis, Peters, and Caldeira 2011; Harrison 2015; Kerr and Duscha 2014; 
Steininger et al. 2016). Yet, to our knowledge, no studies have evaluated the prospects for 
fossil fuel-based accountability frameworks in international climate governance with 
reference to actually existing fossil fuel MRV systems. Since the most insightful critiques of 
carbon-based accountability frameworks have been developed through rigorous analysis of 
actually existing carbon-based MRV systems, we believe that the nascent discussions of 
fossil fuel-based accountability frameworks could usefully be informed by consideration of 
how fossil fuel MRV systems work in practice. Thus, rather than starting with the goal of 
climate mitigation and assuming that the object of governance should be the most proximate 
means of reaching the goal, our inquiry begins with the potential objects of governance 
themselves, considering what prospects each object offers the would-be climate governance 
architect. 
Fossil fuels are already accounted for by market and state actors, primarily for the purposes 
of securing and transacting supplies. However, no comprehensive, global accountability 
framework for fossil fuels currently exists for any purpose, let alone for the purpose of 
climate governance. Drawing on theories and tools from Science & Technology Studies, we 
 
1 See below section entitled “The limits of carbon-based accountability frameworks”. 
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analyse examples of these accountability frameworks to illuminate the social, technical and 
political processes by which relevant facts about fossil fuels have been produced and mobilised 
for particular economic and political purposes (Jasanoff 2006). Do these frameworks lend 
themselves to forms of elite-driven governance similar to carbon-based frameworks, or do 
they provide opportunities for expanded democratic oversight? And what does this imply 
for the prospects for just and effective climate governance?  
The article is structured as follows. We first specify what we mean by accountability 
frameworks and explain why they matter for governance in general, and for international 
climate cooperation in particular. We then summarise the main critiques of carbon-based 
accountability frameworks, with an emphasis on sociological literature that has engaged 
with actually existing MRV systems. Subsequently, we analyse and discuss three types of 
fossil fuel-based MRV systems, each based on a different object of governance: fossil fuel 
reserves, production, and infrastructure. We conclude with a comparative discussion that 
summarises the contributions of the paper and the implications of our findings for 
international climate governance. 
Accountability frameworks and climate governance  
We conceptualise an accountability framework, in the context of international climate 
governance, as consisting of the following three elements: (i) a set of norms by which 
responsibility for achieving collective goals is allocated among agents (we assume 
responsibility will pertain to an object of governance that is instrumental to, or a proxy for, 
the ultimate goal); (ii) a system of MRV so as to yield factual information about agents’ 
causal role with respect to the relevant object of governance; and (iii) a set of institutions or 
practices for holding agents to account for their (non-)compliance with the relevant norms.2  
With regard to element (i), we assume for the purpose of our analysis that parties are 
ultimately interested in achieving the goal of just and effective climate mitigation, and that 
some form of fossil fuel-based state responsibility is normatively appropriate.3 We are 
interested in investigating which particular fossil fuel-based objects of governance are more 
or less conducive to this goal. For this purpose, we shall focus on element (ii), namely MRV 
systems for the various objects we consider. The core function of an MRV system is to yield 
factual information about whether collective goals are being achieved and about which 
agents have causally contributed to the achievement, or otherwise, of those goals. Ideally, 
this information is of high quality—i.e. transparent (observable to third parties), accurate (a 
true representation), comparable (able to be meaningfully compared across entities) and 
timely (available in close to real-time).4 Together, the first two elements of an accountability 
 
2 For a similar scheme, albeit further disaggregated into five categories, see Gupta and van Asselt 
(2019). 
3 For discussion of this element, see Harrison (2015) and Steininger et al. (2016). 
4 This formulation is a slight modification of the UNFCCC’s criteria for national accounting: 
transparent, accurate, complete, comparable, consistent. We drop “complete” and “consistent” as 
these are less relevant outside of UNFCCC-specific carbon accounting schemes, and add “timely” 
because the timeliness of data availability clearly matters if states are to be held accountable in ways 
that are conducive to improved climate outcomes. 
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framework reveal which agents have (not) complied with their responsibilities. Accordingly, 
they provide the normative and factual basis for holding the relevant agents to account.  
This brings us to element (iii), which concerns the institutions or practices by which a 
relevant agent is held to account (Gupta and van Asselt 2019; Newell 2008). Some 
international regimes include formal compliance systems. High quality information is a 
prerequisite for holding agents accountable through such systems where they exist. 
However, we assume that formal compliance systems under the international climate 
regime will for the foreseeable future remain soft, under-resourced, and largely ineffective in 
advancing decarbonisation (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen et al. 2018). Crucially, though, they are 
not the only channels through which states can be held to account.  
Numerous alternative accountability channels exist, and these are critically important to the 
success of global climate governance (van Asselt 2016; Falkner 2016; Hale 2016; Jacobs 2016; 
Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen et al. 2018; Keohane and Oppenheimer 2016).5 We emphasise two 
such channels: (i) at the international level, informal assessments by states of their peers’ 
compliance with an international norm, which inform their behaviour toward the (non-
)compliant state; and (ii) domestically and transnationally, various forms of “civil redress” 
by civil society actors, such as NGO and media criticism, protests and civil disobedience 
(Mason 2005; see also Newell 2008).  
The importance of MRV systems for climate governance can thus be (re-)conceptualised in 
terms of their role in enabling a variety of agents to hold states to account through alternative 
accountability channels. These actors may be able to impose various kinds of costs on non-
compliant states, be they economic costs or social/political costs such as reputational 
damage, blame, disesteem, and exclusion from international fora. Avoiding these various 
costs (or seeking benefits from compliance) is a key reason why states are more likely to 
unilaterally comply with international agreements when they know that compliance can 
easily be verified by third parties (Chayes and Chayes 1991, 323–24, 1998).  
Crucially, however, different types of agents may have different motivations and different 
means available to impose costs (or confer benefits) on states. Elite actors (within other 
states, national governments, and business firms) may have greater means to impose cost on 
non-compliant governments, yet their interests are more likely to be entangled with those of 
the non-compliant state. This risk is especially great in the context of climate change, given 
the close relationships that typically exist between the state, the energy sector, energy-
intensive industrial interests and finance capital (Paterson and Newell 2010). Accordingly, a 
democratisation of the information needed to hold states to account is likely to be conducive 
to just and effective climate governance (Stevenson 2021). This imperative illuminates the 
value for climate governance of MRV systems that yield high quality information about state 
compliance that is transparent to civil society actors. 
Because it affects states’ compliance rates, the quality of information produced by an MRV 
system—including its transparency to a wide range of actors—can also have dynamic effects 
 




on international cooperation. First, as more states comply and see others complying, the 
social costs of non-compliance increase (Collier and Venables 2015; Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998; Johnston 2001). Modest improvements in verifiable compliance can thus trigger 
tipping dynamics that result in relatively rapid increases in overall regime compliance—a 
phenomenon often interpreted as a strengthening of the underlying social/moral norm 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Green 2018a; Nyborg et al. 2016). Second, increased 
compliance, where mutually verified, can facilitate greater stringency in collectively agreed 
international rules over time by building trust and confidence among cooperating parties 
(Bell et al. 2012; Chayes and Chayes 1998; Victor 2011).  
In sum: the chosen object of governance influences the prospects for MRV, and hence the 
quality of information available to different kinds of actors; this, in turn, influences the 
potential for different actors to hold governments to account via various alternative 
accountability channels; these accountability channels ultimately influence state compliance 
and the prospects for enhancing cooperation over time. With this theoretical model in mind, 
we now summarise the state of knowledge about carbon-based accountability frameworks, 
before considering the prospects for fossil fuel-based frameworks. 
The limits of carbon-based accountability frameworks 
Carbon accounts expressed in terms of CO2e, though presented by scientists and many 
governing actors as determinate facts, involve multiple layers of abstraction from the 
underlying physical reality of emissions and the multiplicity of social contexts in which they 
are produced (Dehm 2018; Lövbrand and Stripple 2011). “Greenhouse gas” is an umbrella 
term for a basket of gases with different chemical properties, each of which has a different 
warming effect. They are rendered equivalent to one another via the notion of Global 
Warming Potential, which enables all gases to be standardised against the warming effect of 
carbon dioxide over a 100-year timeframe (hence ‘CO2e’), albeit with considerable 
uncertainty and requiring fundamental value judgements.6 These gases are primarily 
produced from the combustion of fossil fuels to produce energy, but also from a range of 
industrial and agricultural processes. Greenhouse gases are also sequestered in and released 
from the land-sector in natural processes and as a result of human activities. These various 
causal processes, moreover, are embedded in diverse sociotechnical, economic and political 
contexts. By abstracting from these contextual features in order to isolate common 
properties, carbon accounting proponents created equivalences between diverse activities 
(Dehm 2018; Lövbrand and Stripple 2011; MacKenzie 2009). 
The historical dominance of CO2e as the object of climate governance has been underpinned 
by its support within multiple constituencies for whom these layers of abstraction have 
served useful functions. On the one hand, scientists, economists, policymakers and 
professionalised environmental NGOs have supported carbon-based accountability because 
it is widely perceived to hold out the promise of human control over the climate system 
through a kind of precision management of all of its human-controlled inputs (Allan 2017; 
Victor 2001). At the same time, however, carbon-based accountability has been supported by 
 
6 This has been particularly controversial with regard to methane (see Dehm 2018, 313). 
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carbon-intensive states and firms because the fungibility enabled by abstraction has 
provided opportunities for them to maximise flexibility and minimise compliance costs: 
path-dependent fossil fuel-based systems have been allowed to expand while carbon-based 
obligations have been met through less scrutable and more tenuous mitigation activities 
such as land-based sequestration, industrial gas destruction, “offsetting” and avoided 
deforestation (Dehm 2018; Kuch 2015). 
These outcomes have been facilitated by the complexity of carbon-based MRV systems, 
especially in the areas just mentioned. This complexity necessitates heavy reliance on 
professional experts—to establish baselines, develop monitoring systems, set reporting and 
other standards, formulate procedures for making disclosures, interpret such disclosures, 
and evaluate their performance (Kuch 2015; MacKenzie 2009). These acts have political 
significance and affect large financial flows in the nascent carbon economy, meaning carbon 
professionals exercise de facto political authority (Kuch 2015; Lövbrand and Stripple 2011; 
Pearse 2018; Stripple and Lövbrand 2010). It therefore matters what incentives these 
professionals face, and whose interests they serve. To a considerable extent, carbon 
management expertise has been employed by those agents with the greatest interest in 
minimising their apparent causal role in driving climate change (Kuch 2015). Carbon-
intensive states employ these experts to help them shape international MRV and accounting 
systems in ways that maximise their flexibility (Kuch 2015). Meanwhile, the fact that 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas point sources are highly dispersed and mostly controlled by 
private agents means domestic regulatory systems inevitably devolve extensive authority 
over MRV processes to carbon-intensive firms and for-profit auditing firms (see Bellassen 
and Stephan 2015). In these circumstances, there is a risk that the subjective judgements of 
these experts become biased toward the narrow interests of their employers and clients. 
Decades of experience with real-world carbon-based MRV systems has revealed how easily 
this form of corruption can occur: systems of carbon accounting, trading and offsetting have 
created vast opportunities for mischief by states and firms, ranging from system-gaming to 
outright fraud (Bellassen et al. 2015; Interpol 2013; Kuch 2015; Martin and Walters 2013; 
Schneider 2009, 2011; Shishlov, Morel, and Bellassen 2016).  
The problems with carbon-based accountability frameworks have undoubtedly undermined 
climate governance efforts under the auspices of the UNFCCC. The vast scope for gaming in 
carbon accounting processes makes it easy for states to present themselves as taking 
meaningful action whilst in fact doing little to address the systemic drivers of GHG 
emissions (Kuch 2015; Shishlov, Morel, and Bellassen 2016; Stevenson 2021). The resulting 
epistemic murkiness does not appear to have built trust and confidence among participating 
states or resulted in increased ambition (Gupta and van Asselt 2019).7 With the Paris 
Agreement’s more decentralised, voluntary and heterogeneous approach to mitigation, the 
 
7 At the very least, mistrust over carbon-based accountability appears to have undermined progress in 




pursuit of accountability for carbon fluxes has only become more elusive (Keohane and 
Oppenheimer 2016; Weikmans, van Asselt, and Roberts 2020).  
Carbon-based accountability frameworks, in short, have well served the narrow interests of 
carbon-intensive states and firms, financial actors, and the expert community of carbon 
managers. Yet they have not simultaneously delivered the precision management system for 
climate control for which its more public-spirited advocates have long hoped. These 
outcomes have led many to question whether carbon-based accountability frameworks—
and the opaque, elite-dominated forms of governance they enable—really serve the public 
interest, understood in terms of just and effective climate mitigation (Kuch 2015; Pearse and 
Böhm 2014). It is in this context that the search for accountability frameworks anchored in 
fossil fuels has emerged. 
Fossil fuel-based accountability frameworks 
Fossil fuel reserves  
Fossil fuel reserves are measures that relate to physical stocks of oil, gas and coal under the 
Earth’s surface. However, they are not bounded, factual quantities. Rather, reserves are 
sociotechnical constructs that combine probabilistic expert judgements about the existence of 
geological resources with judgements about the commercial viability of those resources 
(Association of Chartered Certified Accountants and Carbon Tracker Initiative 2013; 
Bebbington et al. 2020).  
In jurisdictions in which privately-owned mining and petroleum firms predominate, 
industry standards for evaluating and classifying reserves were developed at national levels 
to foster investor confidence in fossil fuel firms and to satisfy regulatory interests in market 
stability (Camisani-Calzolari 2004). Consistent with wider trends in standardisation noted 
by sociologists (Timmermans and Epstein 2010), these standards were later internationalised 
to meet the needs of globalising financial capital and fossil fuel markets, and in some cases 
to allay security concerns and satisfy international agencies (e.g. the International Atomic 
Energy Agency with respect to Uranium) (Camisani-Calzolari 2004). A commonly used 
template for evaluating and classifying mineral reserves is that published by the Committee 
for Mineral Reserves International Reporting Standards (CRIRSCO) under the auspices of a 
CEO-led industry body, the International Council for Mining and Metals. The equivalent 
template for petroleum reserves is the Petroleum Resource Management System (PRMS) 
developed by the Society of Petroleum Engineers. 8 Many national stock exchanges and 
regulatory bodies adopt evaluation and classification standards that map onto the CRIRSCO 
and PRMS templates (Bebbington et al. 2020).  
According to classification schemes standardly used in both the mining and petroleum 
industries, reserves “refers to oil and gas and mineral resources that are commercially 
viable”, and they are “further broken down into the sub-categories of proved (1P), probable 
(2P) and possible (3P)”, reflecting increasing uncertainties as to their geological status and 
 




commercial viability (ibid, p.8). Resources refers to resources that have been discovered, but 
have not been evaluated to be commercially viable because of any one of a number of 
contingencies (e.g. economic, legal, environmental, social and governmental). Consider, for 
example, the classification scheme for mineral reserves produced by CRIRSCO, shown in 
Figure 1. Under the CRIRSCO scheme, the non-geological contingencies that determine 
whether resources can be classified as reserves are known as “modifying factors”, and a 
probabilistic assessment of these factors is a key part of the classification process.  
Figure 1: Mineral resource classification scheme (CRIRSCO) 
 
Source: CRIRSCO, “About CRIRSCO”, <http://www.crirsco.com/background.asp>. 
Clearly, fossil fuel reserves are highly abstracted quantities. They are a function of both 
geological and commercial assessments and they are thoroughly entangled with processes of 
marketisation and regulation (Barry 2013; Huber 2013; Mitchell 2011). Moreover, their 
construction relies extensively on professional judgement. This is so, for example, even at 
the point of the initial oil pumped from a newly commercialized exploration well—known 
in the industry as ‘first oil’. In Weszkalnys’ (2015) analysis of ‘first oil’, “oil is both a measure 
of value in a globalized economy and a geologic matter that can defy precision prior to, and 
even during, its extraction” (ibid., p. 614). Thus, the Society for Petroleum Engineers heralds 
the importance of their members’ professional skills in evaluating and classifying petroleum 
reserves: “Reserves derived under these definitions rely on the integrity, skill, and judgment 
of the evaluator.”9 Reserves figures attain their status as financial fact by relying on 
professional bodies who circumscribe the terms of those qualified to interpret geological 
data and inform investors. Across the various schemes this professional is standardly 
 




referred to as the ‘Competent Person’, who must be a member of a professional body and 
possess certain specified experience.10 
These features of reserves give rise to three concerns about the suitability of reserves as an 
object of climate governance.  
The first concern pertains to the hybrid geological–commercial nature of reserves and the 
extensive reliance on expert judgement in constructing reserves figures. As discussed, to 
count a quantity of fossil fuels as “reserves”, the evaluator needs to have confidence not only 
in the quantity of the resources in place, but also in the commercial exploitability of those 
resources, which is contingent on various technological, economic, infrastructural, legal, 
political and other factors. Probabilistic judgements about these factors are subject to a range 
of political and technical contingencies (Weszkalnys 2015)—a feature that is compounded by 
the multifactorial nature of the reserves classification process. Should reserves come to be 
the object of supply-side climate governance, the contingency of reserves figures on 
subjective judgements about these contingent factors would leave extensive room for 
manipulation and gaming.11 
The risk of gaming is amplified by a second concern: the evaluation and classification of a 
mining and petroleum firm’s reserves is an elite process controlled by a small epistemic 
community with vested interests in expanded production for commercial gain. This concern 
is particularly acute in countries with nationally-owned fossil fuel producers, such as the 
national oil companies (NOCs) that control an estimated 90% of global oil reserves (Tordo, 
Tracy, and Arfaa 2011). Evaluation and classification practices in unlisted, state-owned fossil 
fuel firms are controlled by the firms themselves, and, like many decisions by such firms, 
tend to be opaque to third parties other than relevant commercial partners (Manley and 
Heller 2021).12 Unlisted privately-owned firms, too, often face few public checks on their 
self-determination of reserves. Stock-exchange listed firms are subjected to additional 
regulatory requirements governing the disclosure of reserves for purposes such as their 
initial public offering and annual reporting. Regulations governing listed firms typically 
cross-refer to applicable industry standards for reserves evaluation and classification, which 
require reserves to be evaluated by “Competent Persons”, as discussed above (Association 
of Chartered Certified Accountants and Carbon Tracker Initiative 2013). However, only in 
some cases are Competent Persons required to be independent of the firm that owns the 
resource. Even where independent experts are engaged, the evaluation and classification 
 
10 CRIRSCO reporting template, 2019, 
<http://www.crirsco.com/templates/CRIRSCO_International_Reporting_Template_November_2019.p
df> and PRMS—2018 Update, <https://www.spe.org/en/industry/petroleum-resources-management-
system-2018/>.  
11 It may be that, in practice, evaluators confine their judgements primarily to geological matters. To 
the extent this is the case, however, reserves figures are a less reliable approximation of a firm’s or 
state’s contribution to climate change, since these reserves may have a low probability of commercial 
exploitation. In any event, the potential for gaming that we highlight here would remain. 
12 Lax domestic regulation in many NOC jurisdictions also leaves NOCs with little incentive to disclose 
their reserves other than international pressure, which many NOCs and their governments have long 
resisted (Heller and Mihalyi 2019). 
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process itself remains the province of firms and professionals with a narrow band of 
expertise and motivated by profit. Like the accounting firms that audit corporate books and 
verify carbon offsets, independent reserves evaluators have an interest in expanding the 
market for their services, keeping clients happy and growing their client base. Their clients, 
moreover, are fossil fuel producers—an industry notorious for climate obstructionism and 
regulatory evasion.13 
The third concern with using reserves as an object of climate governance pertains to the fact 
that fossil fuel reserves—fundamentally a firm-level construct—are a part function of macro-
level phenomena like climate governance. As we have seen, to be classified as reserves, an 
evaluator must have high confidence in the presence of various contingent factors that go to 
commercial exploitability, including the firm’s capacity to extract the resources lawfully and 
profitably. Climate governance—if it is to be effective—requires states to pass laws that either 
directly limit the amount of fossil fuels that firms can extract, or that indirectly do so by 
reducing demand for, and hence the profitability of, extracted fossil fuels. This gives rise to 
an endogeneity problem: if reserves are to form the basis for holding states to account for 
their contributions to climate change with a view to ratcheting up climate action, then the 
very changes in climate laws that reserves-based climate governance would be supposed to 
precipitate would themselves alter the reserves figures. Because reserves reflect firm-
mediated expectations about laws, costs of production, demand scenarios and prices, any 
serious decarbonisation process would likely trigger significant fluctuations in reserves 
classifications and disclosures. Under these conditions, international climate governance 
anchored in reserves-based accountability would become akin to shadow boxing.  
Fossil fuel production 
Fossil fuel production figures refer to the actual, physical quantities of oil, gas and coal that 
are extracted from the ground and commercially supplied (or directly used in the producing 
firm’s operations) over a given time period. The physical quantities can be measured in 
various ways—primarily by volume, weight or energy content—depending on the fuel in 
question, its physical state, and the purpose of the measurement. For example, petroleum is 
often quantified volumetrically (e.g. barrels of oil; cubic metres of gas) by firms for 
commercial purposes, such as contracts and purchase orders, and for compliance purposes, 
such as reporting to capital markets, tax authorities and regulatory agencies, whereas it is 
measured by weight for purposes of shipping.14 Coal is standardly measured in tonnes for 
these purposes. Since commercial buyers of fossil fuels are typically interested in the amount 
of energy that can be produced from the fuels, measures of a fuel’s density are typically also 
used for commercial purposes. A fuel’s energy content affects its “quality”, along with other 
factors such as the presence of impurities in the fuel. 
 
13 See, e.g., National Whistleblower Centre, Oil & Gas Case Studies, 
<https://www.whistleblowers.org/oil-gas-case-studies/>. This malfeasance extends to fraudulent 
reserves classification and reporting, as illustrated by the Shell oil and gas reserves scandal of the 
mid-2000s (see Taylor 2006). 
14 Fossil gas can be liquefied for transport via LNG tanker. 
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Weight and volume can be readily ascertained by any agent who has physical access to the 
relevant stock of fuel and to standard instruments for weighing and metering industrial 
quantities of it. On the one hand, this means that produced fossil fuel volumes and tonnages 
are the exclusive domain of the production firm, its customers, and the shipping, pipeline, or 
other transportation operator (if contracted to a third party), which limits the scope for civil 
society oversight. On the other hand, these other commercial parties have an interest in the 
accurate measurement of volumes and weights so as to ensure they are getting what they 
paid for, and the amounts can be verified using standard instrumentation. This both limits 
the scope for subjective judgement and allows for a degree of triangulation among different 
parties to a transaction, ultimately constraining the scope for data manipulation. The ready 
verifiability of fossil fuel transactions also creates opportunities for government oversight, 
which could be expanded in the interests of supply-side climate governance. These 
properties of fossil fuel flows and their social context suggest that fossil fuel production 
figures would be a more reliable basis for climate accountability and governance than fossil 
fuel reserves.  
Nevertheless, there are some limitations with using mere volumetric figures for climate 
governance. The energy content of a given quantity of fuels can vary, and it is the energy 
content that matters from a climate perspective as it affects the carbon intensity of the fuel. A 
fuller picture of fossil fuel producers’ causal role in climate change is therefore attained 
through fossil fuel production-based carbon-accounting, which in turn relies on 
measurements of a fuel’s energy content. Determining the energy content of fossil fuels (and 
other “quality” factors), however, requires more sophisticated laboratory testing of 
shipment samples. Depending on the terms of a given contract, producers may do this 
testing themselves or contract it out to an independent surveyor, whose quality assessments 
form the basis of certifications attached to shipments. Testing arrangements provide 
opportunities for corruption on the supplier’s side of the supplier/customer interface. 
Recently, for example, global coal markets were rocked by the revelation that laboratory 
tests in Australia by a large testing company were faked over the course of decades to “keep 
clients happy”.15 The replicability of laboratory testing suggests that stricter regulation, 
mandating more frequent and independent testing, could reduce this risk. Still, there is 
likely to be a trade-off between using a rougher proxy for climate contribution that is more 
reliable (volumes of each fossil fuel) and a closer proxy for climate contribution that is more 
amenable to manipulation and gaming (carbon embodied in fossil fuel production).  
Given the broad suitability of fossil fuel production volume data for climate accountability 
and governance, it is worth considering the potential for the collection of such data to be 
scaled globally. Until recently, efforts to aggregate production data have largely been 
confined to the national level, as many states have come to see fossil fuel production both as 
a source of national wealth and a matter of national security. Nonetheless, this interplay of 
market and security logics in oil production has also led to the formation of international 
 





institutions. The International Energy Agency (which largely formalised the rich-country 
“oil buyers’ club” following the oil shocks of the 1970s), and more recent initiatives such as 
the Joint Organisations Data Initiative (JODI) have sought to make oil and gas conform to 
economists’ models of markets, and states’ desire for security of oil supply. JODI is a joint 
initiative of various international bodies that explicitly aims to reduce the “data uncertainty” 
that contributes to volatility in energy markets.16 However, doubts remain about the success 
of this initiative. Moreover, JODI’s interests in transparency are conceived narrowly in terms 
of market stabilisation and efficiency, underscoring the wider concern mentioned earlier: 
that the MRV of fossil fuel production remains dominated by elite actors with a relatively 
narrow set of commercial interests. A nascent collaborative initiative between three NGOs 
challenges this paradigm (FFNPTI 2020). The initiative aims to develop a Global Registry of 
Fossil Fuels, which involves monitoring and reporting production data from every field in 
every country, with a view to informing supply-side climate governance efforts.17 The 
results of this ongoing initiative will shed further light on the feasibility of fossil fuel 
production-based accountability frameworks in international climate governance.  
Fossil fuel infrastructure  
The third possible object of supply-side climate governance is fossil fuel production projects 
and infrastructure (hereafter “infrastructure” for simplicity). Fossil fuel infrastructure has 
various features that are conducive to MRV that yields high quality information.  
The principal benefit of fossil fuel infrastructure is that the infrastructure itself, and the 
practices surrounding it, are transparent to a wide range of observers, including civil society 
actors. Fossil fuel infrastructure under construction and in operation typically has a large 
physical footprint, meaning it is easily observable by third parties on the ground and via 
satellite imagery. Detection by such third parties, moreover, does not require complex 
measurement procedures or any specialist training and equipment. Further, because fossil 
fuel infrastructure has a large physical footprint and requires substantial, upfront 
investment in fixed assets, project proponents typically must undertake various activities 
before the project becomes operational. These may include making announcements to 
investors, obtaining government approvals and licences, and negotiating with local 
stakeholders. The physical footprint of fossil fuel infrastructure often provokes local forms 
of resistance grounded in concerns about competing land and water usages and local 
pollution risks, which gives a wide-range of groups—well beyond typical climate activists—
a stake in infrastructure approval processes (Cheon and Urpelainen 2018). Because of the 
salience and observability of infrastructure-related processes to such a wide range of third 
parties, producer countries can be held to account for fuelling climate change via civil 
society accountability channels more readily than is the case with other potential objects of 
supply-side (and carbon-based) climate governance.18  
 
16 JODI FAQs, <https://www.jodidata.org/about-jodi/faqs.aspx>.   
17 Forthcoming at <https://fossilfuelregistry.org/>. 
18 The extent to which these activities occur and are observable by third parties is somewhat context-
dependent, with fossil fuel infrastructure-related developments typically more easily observable for 
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These features of fossil fuel infrastructure and its implications for climate governance are 
well illustrated by the work of the NGO Global Energy Monitor (GEM). GEM is dedicated to 
providing transparent information about the global energy system, including descriptive 
data on fossil fuel infrastructure around the globe.19 This data is housed and regularly 
updated on GEM Wiki20—an open, community-built resource featuring interlinked pages 
covering all aspects of the global energy system, thousands of which are individual 
“profiles” of fossil fuel projects.21 Each profile is a footnoted online fact sheet, providing data 
on such matters as the project’s location, size, capacity (e.g. production capacity of 
coalmines; throughput capacity of pipelines), developmental status (e.g. “pre-construction”, 
“operating”), ownership and financing. Many profiles also include detailed information 
about the project’s history and about ongoing economic and political developments. GEM 
Wiki relies primarily on a decentralised crowdsourcing model to provide timely and 
accurate information about fossil fuel infrastructure. Anyone with internet access can create 
new articles on the GEM Wiki and edit existing ones, and GEM relies on a network of local 
volunteer contributors and partner organisations to input the data. The transparency of 
fossil fuel infrastructure to lay citizens, local activists, journalists and other interested parties 
means that relevant project developments can be monitored and reported in close to real-
time by individuals and organisations with public interest motivations. It is also conducive 
to accuracy: with such transparent activities, the risk of inaccuracies arising and remaining 
undetected and uncorrected by other contributors to the site is low.22  
Finally, fossil fuel infrastructure falls into a small number of categories (oil rigs; LNG 
terminals etc.) within which the technologies used are relatively standardised across the 
globe. This makes it easier to detect fossil fuel infrastructure developments and operations, 
and to aggregate information within each category. This feature is also exploited by GEM: its 
various “Tracker” projects aggregate the infrastructure data from GEM Wiki into thematic 
databases and maps of various types of energy infrastructure, allowing GEM to aggregate, 
visualise, analyse and communicate its data in a user-friendly way.23  
The main drawback of using fossil fuel infrastructure for climate governance is that the data 
generated provides only a very rough proxy of a country’s contribution to climate change 
because it does not account for the capacity and output of the projects in question, let alone 
the embodied carbon. This means that climate governance efforts focused solely on 
infrastructure could create perverse incentives. For example, limiting the number of new 
coalmines or petroleum drilling sites would encourage the development of larger sites and 
the more intense utilisation of existing infrastructure. This suggests the value of a hybrid 
 
stock-exchange listed entities and in jurisdictions with more stringent regulatory requirements (see 
Heller and Mihalyi 2019 regarding NOC disclosures).  
19 GEM also tracks public finance flows for coal and the GEM Wiki contains a range of entries on the 
global energy system that extend beyond fossil fuel infrastructure. 
20 GEM Wiki is a collaboration between GEM and the Center for Media and Democracy. 
21 GEM Wiki (main page), <https://www.gem.wiki/Main_Page> accessed 19/5/2021. 
22 Ibid. 
23 See GEM, Projects, <https://globalenergymonitor.org/projects/>.  
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accountability framework focused on both infrastructure and production—a point to which 
we return in our concluding discussion.24  
Concluding discussion 
In closing, we highlight our two key findings and draw some conclusions about the 
desirable direction of supply-side international climate cooperation. Our paper has 
contributed to the debate about this issue by evaluating plausible candidate objects of 
governance—reserves, production and infrastructure—in light of their characteristics and 
the possibilities for MRV and accountability to which they give rise. 
First, we have raised major concerns about anchoring climate governance in a fossil fuel 
reserve-based accountability framework. The construction of facts about fossil fuel reserves 
requires extensive expert and values-based judgements by professionals who are 
accountable to firms and professional bodies with histories and interests entwined with 
market logics of extraction for profit. The chequered history of carbon-based MRV, 
accounting and trading suggests this combination of features poses a high risk of 
manipulation and gaming by profit-maximising firms. A further problem arises from the 
fact that climate governance—especially climate laws—inform the very expert judgements 
that determine reserves figures in the first place.  
Though not suitable as an object of governance for the purpose of international climate 
cooperation, reserves figures, with suitable reforms to harmonise and aggregate the data, 
could potentially be useful as an additional information source—for example, to provide an 
indicative historical baseline to inform policy planning; to provide a secondary information 
source by which to informally gauge progress in decarbonisation efforts; and to inform civil 
society about the location and size of potential future production sites. There is undoubtedly 
social value in ongoing efforts to align fossil fuel reserves disclosures with carbon limits (e.g. 
Carbon Tracker Initiative 2011), but our analysis suggests this value lies mainly in 
improving the accountability of firms to investors and in enhancing the efficiency and 
governance of capital markets, rather than in holding states to account for their contribution 
to climate change. The democratisation of reserve reporting is thus a political project yet to 
come. 
Our second set of findings sheds light on some more promising directions for fossil fuel-
based climate governance based on the MRV of fossil fuel production volumes and 
infrastructure. Fossil fuel production data are less susceptible to manipulation than reserves 
(and CO2e) figures, and provide a more proximate indication of a state’s causal role in 
 
24 A variant of infrastructure accounting that takes into account the infrastructure’s capacity could be 
used for climate governance purposes. A state’s capacity to produce and supply the various fossil 
fuels via relevant infrastructure provides a more proximate measure of its climate contribution than 
infrastructure per se. However, capacity does not necessarily imply actual production (infrastructure 
can be under-utilised), so any infrastructure capacity measure would be insufficient for climate 
governance purposes. Moreover, adopting this unit of account would imply some loss in data 
transparency, since infrastructure capacity is not directly observable by third parties in the way that a 
piece of infrastructure itself is observable. 
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climate change than infrastructure data. However, a drawback is that the activities and 
transactions that underpin production data are only transparent to actors with relatively 
narrow commercial interests, meaning governments would need to exercise expanded 
regulatory oversight. By contrast, fossil fuel infrastructure provides a less proximate 
indicator of carbon contribution, but is transparent to a wide range of third parties in close 
to real time. Crucially, infrastructure is transparent and salient to civil society actors—
including the multiplicity of groups invested in competing land and water uses—which 
offers the invaluable benefit of mobilising public-spirited agents in the governance effort.  
Our analysis points to the virtues of a hybrid fossil fuel-based accountability framework that 
accounts for infrastructure and production volumes.25 Such a framework would lend itself to 
application in two parallel (or sequential) international climate governance initiatives. The 
first initiative is a ban on new fossil fuel infrastructure/projects (and infrastructure/project 
expansions). Such a ban makes principled sense, because adding new fossil fuel 
infrastructure risks locking-in emissions that would exceed carbon budgets consistent with 
the Paris climate goals (International Energy Agency 2021; Pfeiffer et al. 2018; Smith et al. 
2019; Tong et al. 2019). It would also crystallise a clear and compelling prohibitionary norm, 
compliance with which can easily be monitored and verified by civil society actors (Green 
2018c, 2018a). As noted earlier, this combination of features is conducive to compliance 
cascades among cooperating states and has the potential to build trust and confidence ahead 
of more ambitious cooperation, such as a managed and just phase-out of existing 
infrastructure and/or production volumes (Green 2018c, 2018a). Moreover, the fact that MRV 
can effectively be outsourced to NGOs like GEM means such a cooperative regime could be 
established quickly (Green 2018c). The second proposed initiative is a phase-out of existing 
production. This could be managed through a system of diminishing production quotas, 
similar to the way the Montreal Protocol manages the production phase-out of ozone-
polluting gases. The Powering Past Coal Alliance, the aim of which is a phase-out of coal-
fired power stations in a Paris Agreement-consistent timeframe, provides something of a 
template for the two initiatives we envisage (Green 2018c).  
Our conclusions are especially pertinent in the light of ongoing NGO efforts to develop a 
global registry of fossil fuels to anchor nascent supply-side climate governance initiatives.26 
Thirty years of attempts to precision-manage the climate system via carbon-based 
accountability frameworks and market mechanisms provide a salutary warning to the 
would-be architects of fossil fuel-based alternatives. While genuine precision management 
of the climate is a mirage, its tantalising prospect has inspired a vast, elite-dominated, 
expert-operated and polluter-captured industry of carbon managers. Fossil fuel-based 
climate governance anchored in accountability for infrastructure and production offer the 
potential to break this mould, harnessing the decentralised power of civil society actors to 
oversee the decline of the fossil fuel era. It won’t be precise, but it might just get the job 
done. 
 
25 Infrastructure capacity data could also be used: see footnote 24, above. 
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